Molinism, named after 16th-century Spanish Jesuit priest and Roman Catholic theologian Luis de Molina of the School of Salamanca, is the thesis that God has middle knowledge. It seeks to reconcile the apparent tension of divine providence and human free will.

Types of Divine Knowledge

According to Kenneth Keathley, author of Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach, Molinists argue that God perfectly accomplishes his will in the lives of genuinely free creatures through the use of his omniscience.[2] Molinists, following Luis de Molina himself, present God’s knowledge in a sequence of three logical moments. The first is God’s knowledge of necessary truths or natural knowledge. These truths are independent of God’s will and are non-contingent. This knowledge includes the full range of logical possibilities. Examples include such statements as “All bachelors are unmarried” or “X cannot be A and non-A at the same time, in the same way, at the same place” or “It is possible that X obtain.” The second is called “middle knowledge” and it contains the range of possible things that would happen given certain circumstances. The third kind of knowledge is God’s free knowledge. This type of knowledge consists of contingent truths that are dependent upon God’s will, or truths that God brings about, that he does not have to bring about. Examples might include statements such as “God created the earth” or something particular about this world which God has actualized. This is called God’s “free knowledge” and it contains the future or what will happen. In between God’s natural and free knowledge is his middle knowledge (or scientia media) by which God knows what his free creatures would do under any circumstance.[2]: 31  These are “truths” that do not have to be true, but are true without God being the primary cause of them. In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John D. Laing has provided an example of middle knowledge: “If John Laing were given the opportunity to write an article on middle knowledge for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he would freely do so.”[3]

Molinists have supported their case scripturally with Christ’s statement in Matthew 11:23:[4]And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day.

The Molinist claims that in this example, God knows what his free creatures would choose under hypothetical circumstances, namely that the Sodomites would have responded in a way that Sodom would still have been in existence in Jesus’ day, given that hypothetical situation.

Matthew 11:23 contains what is commonly called a counterfactual of creaturely freedom. But counterfactuals are to be distinguished from foreknowledge. The Bible contains many examples of foreknowledge such as Deut 31:16–17, where God tells Moses that the Israelites will forsake God after they are delivered from Egypt.[5][non-primary source needed]

Some opponents of Molinism claim that God’s foreknowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals are examples of what God is going to actively bring about. That is, when Christ describes the response of the Sodomites in the aforementioned example, God was going to actively bring it about that they would remain until today.[6] Molinists have responded to this objection by noting that scripture contains examples of God’s foreknowledge of evil acts. For example, the Israelites forsaking God, or Peter’s denial of Christ, are both examples of what one would call overt acts of sin. Yet, according to opponents of Molinism, God is actively bringing about these overt acts of sin. This is fallacious according to the Molinist. In order for this account of prophecy to be valid all prophecies must be wholly good, and never contain evil acts; but this is not what opponents believe to be the case.

Knowledge of Counterfactuals

Molinists believe that God has knowledge not only of necessary truths and contingent truths, but also of counterfactuals. (God’s knowledge of counterfactuals is often referred to as his middle knowledge, although technically that term is more broad than simply the knowledge of counterfactuals.) A counterfactual is a statement of the form “if it were the case that P, it would be the case that Q”. An example would be, “If Bob were in Tahiti he would freely choose to go swimming instead of sunbathing.” The Molinist claims that even if Bob is never in Tahiti, God can still know whether Bob would go swimming or sunbathing. The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this “choosing” of a particular world.

Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:

1. God’s natural knowledge of necessary truths.

2. God’s middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).

—Creation of the World—

3. God’s free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).

Hence, God’s middle knowledge plays an important role in the actualization of the world. In fact, it seems as if God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals plays a more immediate role in perception than God’s foreknowledge. William Lane Craig points out that “without middle knowledge, God would find himself, so to speak, with knowledge of the future but without any logical prior planning of the future.”[7] The placing of God’s middle knowledge between God’s knowledge of necessary truths and God’s creative decree is crucial. For if God’s middle knowledge was after his decree of creation, then God would be actively causing what various creatures would do in various circumstances and thereby destroying libertarian freedom. But by placing middle knowledge (and thereby counterfactuals) before the creation decree God allows for freedom in the libertarian sense. The placing of middle knowledge logically after necessary truths, but before the creation decree also gives God the possibility to survey possible worlds and decide which world to actualize.[8]

Craig gives three reasons for holding that counterfactuals statements are true: “First, we ourselves often appear to know such true counterfactuals. Second, it is plausible that the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle (LCEM) holds for counterfactuals of a certain special form, usually called ‘counterfactuals of creaturely freedom’. Third, the Scriptures are replete with counterfactual statements, so that the Christian theist, at least, should be committed to the truth of certain counterfactuals about free, creaturely actions.”[9]

Theological Implications

William Lane Craig calls Molinism “one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever conceived. For it would serve to explain not only God’s knowledge of the future, but divine providence and predestination as well”.[10] Under it, God retains a measure of divine providence without hindering humanity’s freedom. Since God has middle knowledge, he knows what an agent would freely do in a particular situation. So, agent A, if placed in circumstance C, would freely choose option X over option Y. Thus, if God wanted to accomplish X, all God would do is, using his middle knowledge, actualize the world in which A was placed in C, and A would freely choose X. God retains an element of providence without nullifying A’s choice and God’s purpose (the actualization of X) is fulfilled.

Molinists also believe it can aid one’s understanding of salvation. Ever since Augustine and Pelagius there has been debate over the issue of salvation; more specifically, can God elect believers and believers still come to God freely? Protestants who lean more towards God’s election to salvation and sovereignty are usually Calvinists while those who lean more towards humanity’s free choice follow Arminianism. However, the Molinist can embrace both God’s sovereignty and human free choice.

Take the salvation of Agent A. God knows that if he were to place A in circumstances C, then A would freely choose to believe in Christ. So God actualizes the world where C occurs, and then A freely believes. God still retains a measure of his divine providence because he actualizes the world in which A freely chooses. But, A still retains freedom in the sense of being able to choose either option. Molinism does not affirm two contradictory propositions when it affirms both God’s providence and humanity’s freedom. God’s providence extends to the actualization of the world in which an agent may believe upon Christ.

  1.  Molinism : the contemporary debate. Kenneth J. Perszyk. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011. pp. Introduction. ISBN 978-0-19-959062-9. OCLC 751726095.
  2. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e Keathley, Kenneth (2010). Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach. Nashville: B&H Publishing Group. pp. 16–41. ISBN 978-0-8054-3198-8.
  3. ^ Laing, John D. “Middle Knowledge”. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP). Retrieved 17 April 2018.
  4. ^ Seber, George A. F. (2016). Can We Believe It?: Evidence for Christianity. Eugene OR: Wipf and Stock. pp. 128–130. ISBN 978-1498289191. Retrieved 17 April 2018.
  5. ^ The Bible also contains several examples of counterfactuals, such as 1Samuel 23:1–14 and Wisdom of Solomon 4:11.
  6. ^ This is the stance that Gregory Boyd takes, among other places, in his book God of the possible.[full citation needed]
  7. ^ Craig. The Only Wise God. 1999 p. 134.
  8. ^ Craig, William Lane (2009). “The Middle-Knowledge View”. In Beilby, James K.; Eddy, Paul R. (eds.). Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views. pp. 119–159. ISBN 978-0-8308-7493-4.
  9. ^ Jump up to:a b Craig, William Lane (2001). l. Peterson, Michael (ed.). “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the Grounding Objection”. Faith and Philosophy. 18 (3): 337–52. doi:10.5840/faithphil200118329.
  10. ^ Craig. The Only Wise God. 1999 p. 127.

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